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Abstract 
Traditionally international trade disputes within the WTO have been handled 
through diplomacy or soft law. In recent years there has been a shift towards a 
more rule based system within the organization, a shift towards legalization, hard 
law. States that are not acting in compliance with the WTO rules might be brought 
to the Dispute Settlement Body. The first time Least Developed Countries, LDC, 
were involved in a legal dispute in the WTO was in 2003, when American cotton 
subsidies were challenged by Brazil. West African cotton producing states, C4 
signed up as third parties, however not Burkina Faso. Instead Burkina Faso was 
involved in the cotton initiative which was presented at the same time. Through a 
qualitative textual analysis of articles I study legalization versus negotiations in 
the WTO and its effect on LDC. No actual change has come of the legal case or 
the negotiation track but scholars are increasingly considering the leverage that 
legal measures provide negotiations with. The increased legalization has “levelled 
the playing field” and increased the presence of developing countries in the WTO 
negotiations and legal disputes. Not only by the rulings but because of the 
increased attention from media, civil society and the reputational costs associated 
with breaking the law.  
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1 Introduction 
International agreements have traditionally been based on diplomatic negotiations. 
This has also been the case in international trade. The reliance on diplomacy in 
negotiations has been decreasing over time and a more rule based, legalized; 
system has taken its place (Seth 2004:80). This has by some scholars been seen as 
a positive change as bilateral negotiations, according to them, tend to create an 
uneven power situation giving some states greater influence in trade negotiations 
(Jackson 2008:439). No other international organization can be compared to the 
legal framework within the WTO. John H Jackson describes the WTO dispute 
settlement system as ”probably the most powerful and most significant 
international tribunal system in existence today” (Jackson 2008:439)  
 
“...the degree of rule orientation in what is often described as the most powerful 
international juridical institution in the world today” (Jackson 2008:438). 
 
This shift towards hard law, increased legalization, within the WTO, some 
scholars argue, has helped level the playing field in favour of the developing 
countries. No longer do they have to hesitate challenging a more influential state 
on which its trade and international relations depends (Jackson 2008:440f). 
Regardless of rulings against influential actors like the EU and US within the 
WTO these actors still seem to have great power and the playing field seems far 
from levelled. The aim of this thesis is to study how the increased legalization of 
the WTO has affected Least Developed Countries, LDC’s, in West Africa and its 
cotton industry.  
Cotton is West Africa’s most important export crop. Benin, Chad, Burkina 
Faso and Mali, the C4, have economies that are highly depending on producing 
and exporting cotton. The cotton industry also employs many farmers in the 
United States. Due to influential lobbying groups within the US the cotton farmers 
receives large subsidies. In 2003 Brazil, supported by Benin and Chad challenged 
the US subsidies through the Dispute Settlement Body, DSB. The aim was to find 
out if the subsidies were inconsistent with the WTO rules which were later to be 
the outcome. While the DS267 was dealt with by the DSB the C4 presented a 
cotton initiative. The initiative aimed to achieve a lowering of the same subsidies 
that were being challenged in DSB through negotiations, a soft law approach. 
 In this thesis a certain emphasis will be put on Burkina Faso as space does not 
allow a focus on all four states. Burkina Faso is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest 
cotton producer (IMF 2 October 2008).  Burkina Faso is heavily dependent on its 
cotton exports. The US subsidies increased the supply of cotton and suppressed 
the world price causing disastrous effects for Burkina Faso.   
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Regardless of the US loss in dispute DS267 little change has been made and 
the situation for the Burkina Faso cotton industry has not improved (Oxfam 18 
October 2007). The Cotton Initiative in Cancún caused a stalemate in the 
negotiation but did not create any real effect as the Doha Development 
Negotiations seems to be in a constant stalemate. Regardless of the lack of an 
outcome the C4 utilizing the WTOs legal framework has gained increased interest 
from international scholars in recent years 
1.1 Research question and disposition of the thesis 
By analysing articles published by renowned scholars on the cotton issue the 
overarching interest with this thesis is regarding developing countries impact 
within the increasingly legalized WTO.  
 
Has the increased legalization of the WTO resulted in a changed position for 
small, developing states in the WTO?  
 
I will narrow this down to the more manageable question 
 
Has the use of the WTO legal system regarding the cotton case resulted in 
changed position for Burkina Faso within the WTO according to international 
scholars? 
 
 International scholars will be defined further in to the thesis. Research should 
have the ambition to be able to make generalizations from (Esaiasson et al 
2004:25). However, it is bold to make generalizations based on a single -case 
study.  
 
”Tracing the links between trade and poverty is going to be a detailed and 
frustrating task, for much of what one wishes to know is just unknown. It will also 
become obvious that most of the links are very case specific” (Hertel &Winter 
1068). 
 
This thesis starts with a description of the qualitative textual method used and 
a thorough review of the material analysed. This is followed by an overview of 
the theoretical framework used in this thesis; the theory of hard and soft law 
developed by Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal. This is followed by a brief 
description of the legal principles in the WTO and its impact on developing states. 
Burkina Faso and the impact on the American subsidies have on its cotton 
industry will be addressed in the light of hard law; the legal case DS267 and soft 
law; the cotton initiative presented in 2003. An analysis of the hard law versus the 
soft law approach and Burkina Faso’s impact on them follows which leads up to 
the conclusion of whether the increased legalization has had an impact on 
developing states situation within the WTO. 
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2 Method, material and limitations 
2.1 Method  
The method used in the thesis is what Esaiasson et al chose to call a qualitative 
textual analysis. The method is frequently used in social studies (Esaiasson et al 
2004:233f). Through a detailed study of the selected material the aim is to find the 
specific parts of the texts of significance to the topic. This means that a larger 
emphasis is put on certain parts of the texts. Also the text as a whole and the 
context in which it exists is taking in consideration (Esaiasson et al 2004:233). 
These facts make a qualitative textual analysis suitable when much of the content 
is found between the lines. It is a natural choice when basing a study on previous 
research which this thesis does. 
The study at hand uses an open approach. This means that the topics that are 
of interest for the analysis is based on the material itself (Esaiasson et al 
2004:240). By starting the research with a brief overview of the chosen material 
the main topics on which the analysis would be based were selected. Certain 
topics were reappearing in the material and therefore further studied. To let the 
material have an exaggerated influence on the reached conclusions is one of the 
largest risks with an open approach. It is therefore important to consider possible 
outcomes before reaching conclusions and if a different material would have 
provided a different result (Esaiassion et al 2004:241f). A different conclusion 
might have been reached if the material was mainly based on texts by either legal- 
or international relations scholars. A different result would probably also have 
been reached if the material was mainly produced in one part of the world. My 
assumption when starting the research was that a larger importance would be 
given to the legal approach, this as the WTO repeatedly is described as the 
world’s most advanced international tribunal (see Jackson 2008).  By keeping in 
mind the key points of the theory the risk of losing sight of the topic itself is 
minimized. Many scholars highlight the impact of civil society and media, topics 
that are not discussed in the theory. I will further address this issue in the analysis.  
2.2 Material  
The primary material on which the analysis is based on is articles by international 
scholars published in scientific journals. International scholars are defined as 
persons who are specialists in a particular branch of knowledge. In this case the 
special branch is international relations. Political scientists, economists and 
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legalists with an emphasis on international relations are of interest for the study. It 
is consequently the scholars, the actors that are of relevance in the research. 
The articles do not specifically focus on the case DS267 as that would give an 
unwanted emphasis on hard law. The articles deals with the cotton issue in the 
WTO in vast aspects as that better gives an unbiased image of a changed position 
for LDC’s with regards of soft or hard law. The articles are found by a search on 
the WTO, cotton and West Africa in two different internet based search engines. 
From the retrieved articles reviews, publications without an acknowledged author 
and articles that are mainly focused on other issues have been disregarded. The 
fact that the articles are published within the last years increases the probability 
that the studied scholars and the author of this paper make similar assumptions on 
the topic. The scholars have vast ethnicity and different cultural backgrounds. It is 
important to acknowledge this fact as it increases the possibility that different 
interpretations are made by the scholar and the interpreter (Esaiasson et al 
2004:245). Many scholars in this thesis and the journals in which their articles are 
published are African. 
 The secondary material mainly consists of reports published between 2002 
and 2008. The reports are from international organizations such as the WTO, 
Oxfam, the International Monetary Foundation, IMF, and the WB as to keep the 
paper objective. Scholars on the topic of trade and development are referred to 
occasionally. Though not always unbiased I consider their contribution on the 
matter of high relevance to provide the reader with necessary background 
information. The choice to mainly base the paper on articles is a consequence the 
topic being very recent and debated in scientific journals.  The articles represent 
the scholars own view and give a picture of the prevalent trend from when the 
article was published.  
2.3 Limitations 
Putting the emphasis on a single case like that of cotton and LDC’s position 
within the WTO gives a greater possibility to thoroughly examine the subject. It 
increases the possibility to gain a greater familiarity with the detail and allows for 
a deeper understanding of a single case. However, it leaves the author with no 
other choice than to disregard certain aspects. Some scholars, of course, consider 
other factors crucial for LDC’s impact in the WTO. The thesis at hand leaves no 
space to further dwell upon factors that are not in line with the theory of hard and 
soft law and these will therefore only be touched upon briefly. Similarly there is 
no room for an in debt study of the economical effects of the US subsidies on 
Burkina Faso’s economy. The general effects that are of relevance to understand 
the importance of the research topic will be acknowledged but this thesis will not 
engage in a discussion on trade liberalization and its economical effects. This 
paper examines only one case study and its conclusion; while this casts light as to 
whether increased legalization of the WTO has given developing countries more 
strength in multilateral trade negotiations, a definitive empirical theory will 
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necessitate further research which includes more or all LDC to Most Developed 
Countries, MDC, case studies. 
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3 Theory 
There are different ways of solving international disputes. Dispute resolution can 
be said to take place on a scale with diplomatic negotiations on one end and legal 
settlements on the other (Seth 2004:80). The essay is theory using based on 
Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidals’ theory of hard and soft law (International 
Organisation, volume 54, number 3 from 2000, edited by Judith Goldstein, Miles 
Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter).   
Hard law refers to legally binding obligations that are specific and that 
delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law to a third party. Hard 
law has historically been used nationally but has become increasingly important in 
on the international arena. In legal disputes both the procedure and the verdict of 
the case are regulated through norms and praxis. There are no negotiations only a 
judgment of what is in compliance with the law and what is not (Seth 2004:80). 
Use of hard law increases the credibility of international commitments (Abbott & 
Snidal 2000:422). The loss for a party in an agreement characterized by hard law 
is significant as the application of hard law may restrict the actors’ behaviours and 
to some extent their sovereignty (ibid). By accepting an agreement to be bound by 
hard law the parties largely increase their trustworthiness. An increased level of 
legalization gives states higher credibility by increasing costs for non-compliance 
(Abbott & Snidal 2000:427). It also provides the parties with an increased degree 
of predictability by shifting the authority to interpret legal conflicts to a third part 
(ibid). Legal commitments are credible in domestic societies since aggrieved 
parties can enforce rulings with the power of law. This is still not feasible practise 
with regards to international law (Abbott & Snidal 2000:426). However this does 
not mean that legal standards of an international agreement are meaningless and 
unenforceable. To tie an agreement to a broader regime is an effective way to 
ensure compliance since the reputational costs for non-compliance would be 
enormous and spread through the entire regime (Abbott & Snidal 2000:427). Hard 
law does however reduce the costs for enforcement when put in perspective with 
the political and economical cost of “renegotiation, persuasion and coercion” that 
characterizes soft law (Abbott & Snidal 2000:431).  
Soft law is defined by compromising largely due to respect for states 
sovereignty. There is a lack of a legally judging third party and a soft law 
approach does not have efficient measure to ensure and enforce compliance 
(Abbott & Snidal 2000:423). As mentioned above, the diplomatic dispute 
settlement has historically been the most common as a consequence of the 
importance of respecting state sovereignty in international relations (Seth 
2004:80). Abbott and Snidal suggest that the use of soft law in an agreement is a 
deliberate choice between the parties as a superior institutional agreement. An 
advantage of soft law is that it is more achievable, especially when the issue at 
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hand challenges the states sovereignty. Soft legalization is often more effective 
than hard legalization since it allows longer periods of time to implement 
agreements. It enlarges the room for compromising and thereby mutually 
beneficial cooperation between the parties (Abbott & Snidal 2000:423). Even 
though hard law provides an agreement with often needed predictability, the use 
of strict rules may sometimes be counterproductive. The aim of soft law is to 
reach the same results and benefits as with hard law but at a lower economical as 
well as political cost. Since no juridical expertise is needed soft law reduces the 
costs for creating rules, judge in compliance with it and to ensure compliance. 
Politically, states do not have to sacrifice their sovereignty and it also gives the 
state a possibility to discover the consequences of the agreement over time 
(Abbott & Snidal 2000:435).  
 
“Soft legalization allows states to adapt their commitments to their particular 
situation rather than trying to accommodate divergent national circumstances 
within a single text” (Abbott & Snidal 2000:445).  
 
The current trend in international relations and international organizations is a 
shift towards hard law.  
3.1 The WTO and the increased legalization 
The WTO dispute settlement system was introduced as a part of the Uruguay 
agreement from 1995. “Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral 
trading system, and the WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of the global 
economy“(WTO web page). The DSB procedure is based on clearly defined rules 
and has strict timetables for completing a case. All disputes are first to be a 
subject for consultations. 130 out of 332 cases had been a matter for the Panel, 
most cases where settled out of court or remained in a prolonged consultation 
phase (WTO web page July 2005), a soft law or diplomatic solution. Diplomatic 
dispute settlement is still preferred in the WTO and consultation is therefore a 
mandatory first step in the dispute settlement procedure. If the parties are unable 
to solve a conflict through consultation they may ask the DSB to appoint a Panel. 
A party who does not accept the Panel’s decision has the possibility to appeal the 
verdict to the Appellate Body, it is however only possible to appeal the legal 
consequences of the verdict and not presented facts (article 17:6 DSU), (Seth 
2004:86). The preferred method of solving disputes in the WTO is through 
consultation.  The Appellate Body gives a report with their findings and it is then 
up to the DSB to accept or reject the report and make a final ruling (Seth 
2004:94f). In this way the judging power is still a “political” matter between the 
WTO member states. 
The losing party is obliged to implement rulings within a “reasonable period 
of time” (Seth 2004:97). The DSB are entitled to overlook the implementation and 
if proper implementation is not taking place the complaining party may ask for 
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permission to impose retaliation measures (22:2, 22:6 DSU). The authorization of 
countermeasures for non-compliance is a strong incentive for its parties to act 
accordingly (Abbott & Snidal 2000:427) 
. 
3.1 Developing countries and the increased 
legalization 
It is likely to believe that industrialised countries with much legal knowledge and 
the economical possibility to hold a large juridical staff is more willing to commit 
to agreements characterized by hard legalization than developing countries 
(Abbott & Snidal 2000:432f). On the other hand developing countries often seek 
hard legalisation for protection against developed states and thereby avoid 
uncertainty by trying to predict their behaviour (Abbott & Snidal 2000:447f). 
Developing countries are also more willing to concur on hard law agreements 
since they, due to their low impact and control over their own fate, are more 
willing to give up some of their sovereignty. Developed countries with already 
large influence on the outcome of conflicts are, according to international 
relations scholars, less willing to give that up by obeying to hard law agreements 
(ibid).  
Legal scholars tend to argue that hard law benefits weaker states whereas  
international relations scholars consider hard law an advantage for powerful states 
(Abbott & Snidal 2000:447). Abbott and Snidal however consider legally binding 
agreements and precise rules as a factor that evens out the inequalities between 
weak and strong states, e.g. increased legalization levels the playing field. Even 
though industrialised states have a significantly larger influence on agreed upon 
rules it is crucial to make agreements attractive for the developing states as well to 
encourage their participation (Abbott & Snidal 2000:448).   
Hard law might create a problem for developing states as the binding 
agreements might be more politically and economically costly for the poor state to 
follow (Abbott & Snidal 2000:449). A legal agreement creates higher demands 
regarding a legalized way to organize international arrangements within the 
country. Large knowledge of the legal system is crucial to fully be able to use it. 
This creates large economically costs for developing countries due to education 
and expensive legal staff. A political problem for certain developing countries is 
that supervisory rights have to be delegated to international agencies which some 
developing regimes with questionable democratic legitimacy are not open for 
(ibid).  
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4 The war of white gold 
Burkina Faso is one of the world’s poorest countries (Freedom House report in 
Burkina Faso 2008). It is a landlocked country of 13 million inhabitants. Because 
of its disadvantageous geographical location the country has limited natural 
resources and is highly vulnerable to natural disasters and regional instability 
(World Bank Country Brief 2008). Over 80 percent of the population is engaged 
in agriculture of which cotton is the most exported crop. This undiversified 
economy further increases their vulnerability to exogenous factors which is 
clearly stated in the IMF report from October 2008 in which favourable weather 
conditions are referred to as the main reason for a good harvest which will lead to 
a large boost of the countries real GDP (Statement by IMF Staff Mission October 
2, 2008; World Bank report October 2008; Freedom House 2008). Since 1991 
Burkina Faso has implemented economical and political reforms, mostly in the 
form of trade liberalizations, with the help of the World Bank and the IMF, this in 
order to be eligible for loans and debt relief from the same institutions. This has 
lead to decreasing custom duties and value added taxes, VAT (IMF October 2. 
2008; WB report October 2008). 
The United States are the biggest cotton producer in the world in regards to 
quantity exported (Stieglitz 2007:84ff). There are about 25000 active cotton 
farmers in the US. The estimated amount of cotton farmers in Burkina Faso is 700 
000 (Stieglitz 2007:85, Yartey 2008). In Burkina Faso the cotton stands for about 
50-60 percent of the country’s export earnings (Yartey 2008). About 95 per cent 
of the cotton produced in West Arica is exported (Oxfam 2004) The US cotton 
industry is largely subsidized by the US government with between $3 billion to 4$ 
billion a year (Stieglitz 2007:85) The most common defence for the subsidies is 
that they are essential to maintain small family farmers however, most of the 
money goes to large agribusiness (ibid). The consequence of the subsidies is an 
increased profitability by US farmers which they would not have gained on an 
open world market. Daniel Sumner at University of California at Davis estimates 
that American cotton producers would have lost $10 billion between 2000 and 
2005 without support from their government (Oxfam 18 October 2007). The 
subsidies cause an increased total world supply and the price goes down. This has 
a disastrous effect on Burkina Faso’s entire economy as the cotton industry 
employs 17 percent of the population (Stieglitz 2007:86;Yartey 2008) More than 
10 million people in Central and West Africa are dependent  on cotton production. 
These farmers are among the world’s lowest-cost producers, working on small 
areas which they plant and harvest by hand (Heinisch 2006:253). 
The International Cotton Advisory Committee, ICAC estimates that an 
elimination of the American cotton subsidies would raise the world market price 
with between 15-26 percent. Oxfam estimates that as a consequence of the 
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subsidies costs West African countries about $ 191 million a year. In Burkina 
Faso US subsidies cause a loss that exceeds one percent of the country’s GDP 
yearly (Stieglitz 2007:323). Burkina Faso farmers produce cotton for about three 
times less that the US cost of production (Heinisch 2006:254). Although Burkina 
Faso has had increased exports by almost 50 percent since 1994, they receive $60 
million less from export earnings than in the mid 1990s. The C4 together lost 30 - 
40 percent more on the US subsidies than what they received in development 
assistance from the US (Heinich 2006:267). In 2002 Burkina Faso received $10 
million in US aid but due to decreasing cotton prices they lost $13.7 million in 
export earnings (Oxfam 2004). 
4.1 The WTO case DS267 
Hard law is in this thesis illustrated by the DS267. On 27 September 2002 as a 
necessary first step of dispute settlement within the WTO Brazil requested 
consultations with the US (WTO homepage on DS267), this regarding subsidies 
and assistance given to US cotton farmers and exporters, subsidies prohibited 
within the WTO. As a next step in the legal procedure Brazil requested the 
establishment of a panel on 6 February 2003. Benin reserved its third party rights 
in March 2003. Chad did the same in April 2003. A panel was established and on 
the 8 September 2004, the report of the panel was circulated to the Members of 
the WTO. The Panel found that:  
 
“agricultural export credit guarantees are subject to WTO export subsidy 
disciplines and three United States export credit guarantee programmes are 
prohibited export subsidies which have no Peace Clause1 protection and are in 
violation of those disciplines; the United States also grants several other 
prohibited subsidies in respect of cotton; United States’ domestic support 
programmes in respect of cotton are not protected by the Peace Clause, and 
certain of these programmes result in serious prejudice to Brazil’s interests in the 
form of price suppression in the world market.” (DSB Panel report 8 September 
2004). 
 
 Later in 2004 the US notified its intention to appeal the panel’s findings. The   
Appellate Body was handed the case and on 3 March 2005, the Appellate Body 
Report was circulated (ibid). The Appellate Body generally came to the same 
conclusion as the Panel had. A reasonable period of time for the US to revoke its 
illegal subsidies was set to 1 July 2005. On 18 August 2006 still no changes 
regarding the subsidies had been made and Brazil requested the establishment of a 
compliance panel (ibid). On 18 December 2007, the compliance panel report was 
circulated to Members. The Panel found that the US was still acting inconsistently 
                                                
1 Provision in Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement. The cause is an agreement by WTO members not to 
challenge agricultural subsidies that did not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided 
during the 1992 marketing year Expired at the end of 2003. 
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with its obligations to remove subsidies2 in the form of marketing loans and 
counter-cyclical payments and to implement the rulings under DS267. Assistance 
was still provided to US cotton producers and the impact on the world price was 
still significant (WTO webpage on DS267). The US was found to have failed to 
comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings of the SCM Agreement 
which states that they were “to take appropriate steps to remove the adverse 
effects or ... withdraw the subsidy” (ibid). 
On 12 February 2008, the United States notified its decision to appeal the 
legal aspect of these findings. Brazil did the same a few days later. 
4.2 The Cotton Initiative  
Soft law is here illustrated by the cotton initiative. Prior to the ministerial 
conference in Cancún in 2003, the second under the Doha Development Round, 
the Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, hereafter referred to as the cotton 
initiative was presented (Gross 2006:374). The initiative was presented by Benin, 
Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso, the C4, in the General Council and agricultural 
negotiations (WTO webpage on the cotton initiative). It described the harm the 
developed world’s subsidies caused their cotton producers and their countries’ 
economies. The US as well as other developed countries was approached 
(Anderson & Valenzuela 2007:1292). The aim was to eliminate the subsidies and 
demand compensation for lost income (WTO webpage). The initiative was also 
presented by Burkina Faso’s president Blaise Compaoré in the Agriculture 
Committee’s Special Sessions (WTO webpage on the cotton initiative). The 
proposal became an official document in the Cancún negotiations but it was not 
agreed upon whether it should be dealt with as a separate issue or as a part of the 
agricultural negotiations (ibid). No conclusion on the matter was reached in 
Cancún. The conference ended in a stalemate. The C4 walkout from the 
negotiations is seen as a reason for the stalemate but their action cannot be blamed 
for the entire conference failure (Bhagwati 2004). The walkout was supported and 
encouraged by the civil society and influential NGO’s (Heinisch 2006:262). Prior 
to the conference developed states had been engaged in negotiation to which 
developing states were not invited.  
The initiative was further dealt with in 2004 through an agreement to give 
cotton “appropriate” priority and to be dealt with independently. A cotton sub-
committee set up to increase the focus on the matter. In 2004 it was agreed that 
cotton would be addressed “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically” but 
within the negotiations for agriculture (WTO webpage on the cotton initiative). 
An apparent success for the negotiations was the commitment at the ministerial 
conference in Hong Kong in 2005. An agreement to end developed country cotton 
export subsidies by 2006 was reached. It was also agreed that duty-free and quota-
                                                
2 For exact information of inconsistent aid provided by the US government to its cotton producers see WTO 
webpage on the DS267. For the subsidies impact on the C4 and the world market price for cotton see Anderson 
& Valenzuela 2007:1287. 
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free access to LDC cotton exports was to be provided. Cotton subsidies were to be 
dealt with to a greater extent and within a shorter timeframe than other 
agricultural products in “any eventual Doha agreement” (WTO Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration, 2005, Gross 2006:375). However, according to Oxfam 
this may have seemed to be a success for the negotiations but was rather a legal 
success as the ruling in DS267 stated that the subsidies were to be removed within 
the same timeframe. The largest commitment by the US was to impose duty free 
and quota free access to the US market. A worthless promise as the C4 does not 
export cotton to the US market.  
 The last update on the cotton sub-committees work program on WTO 
webpage is from 2005. The importance of success on cotton was addressed by 
Director General, Pascal Lamy on 2 December 2008. His speech indicates that the 
topic is still considered important and that both the EU and the US agrees on the 
importance of “bringing the issue to a closure”. The negotiations are however 
continuously locked (Lamys’ speech on WTO webpage).  
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5 Analysis 
5.1 The price of justice and the cost of 
countermeasures  
As Abbot and Snidal highlights, soft law lowers contracting costs for solving 
disputes and would therefore be of greater use to poor countries without financial 
possibility to make use of the DSB. The DS267 was the first time any of the C4 
were involved in a DSB procedure (Gross 2006:369). It is not stated why Burkina 
Faso did not enter the DS267 as a third party but lack of financial resources as 
well as experience of the legal system are reasons to consider. Amrita Narlikar 
argues that developing countries have traditionally sought greater stability in 
international relations through rules and regimes. This is the opposite of what 
most scholars point out. Narlikar does however claim that hard law has not always 
been favourable. This since the WTO members themselves brings the case to the 
DSB which stress knowledge of the system as well as large financial assets 
(Narlikar 2004:139). The lack of knowledge of the system and insufficient 
funding are two factors of what Abbott and Snidal’s consider to be the largest 
disadvantages for developing countries in a hard law system. The developing 
countries have largely increased their presence in the dispute settlement procedure 
over the last years. But in order for LDC’s to bring a case to the DSU on their 
own considerable resources and skills have to be invested (Jackson 2008:439; 
Narlikar 2004:139). Hard law might be favourable in international dispute 
resolution but only when combined with increased economical resources. 
 
A state’s ability to influence WTO decision-making goes hand in hand with its 
economic strength. Given the unequal power relations between developed and 
developing nations, the latter simply do not have the wherewithal to influence 
WTO policy-making (Makori 2005:222) 
 
The issue has been whether the LDC’s are able to utilize their right under the 
WTO law when negotiating with large developed states. Increased influence both 
in legal matters and negotiations has largely been achieved by forming coalitions, 
like the C4 did regarding the cotton initiative and DS267 (Mori 2004:411). The 
alliance with a larger developing state like Brazil in the DS267 was crucial for the 
LDC’s to take part in the case. Mainly because of Brazils’ larger financial 
resources and the countries joint political and economical power. 
 The developed states have experience and knowledge of the DSB system and 
can afford permanent representation at the WTO head quarter in Geneva. 
Developing countries rarely have time or resources to get locked in to the often 
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stalled and delayed legal processes in the WTO (Narlikar 2004:139f). This 
indicates the view that hard law is too costly for developing states. Donna Lee and 
Nicola J Smith argue that one the most important actions for the C4 is the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, UNECA, workshops for African 
representatives in Geneva. These workshops aim to increase deliberative capacity 
for the small Africa developing countries. This is the most important investment 
for these states as trade negotiations are the key instrument of development (Lee 
& Smith 2008:8). Burkina Faso is supposed to establish a committee in Geneva 
and to take part in trade policy courses and educational activities. However 
Burkina Faso does not have sufficient human and financial resources to 
participate (WTO Trade Policy Review 2004:viii). Most LDCs’ have a minimum 
of representation in Geneva; their representatives are often responsible for their 
countries international relations as a whole rather than specifically focused on the 
WTO matters (Gross 2006:371).  As such they are diplomats rather than trade 
specialists and they have limited knowledge on the dispute settlement procedures 
within WTO (ibid). This compared to developed states stationary large legal staff 
in Geneva which Abbott and Snidal sees as one of the biggest advantages of hard 
law for developed countries (Abbott & Snidal 2000:432f). Elinor Lynn Heinisch 
means that the representation of top level politicians rather than trade experts is 
not only a financial issue but also a way to put trade matters on a political level. 
This was the case regarding the cotton initiative when the C4 was directly 
represented by their presidents rather than trade delegations.  
Olu Fasan argues that a large negative aspect for the developing countries 
ability to utilize the legal system is that it tends to be based on Western countries 
legal system. This provides the developed world with an advantage as they are 
previously acquainted with the legal principles (Fasan 2003:155) 
 
“...many developing countries find themselves more exposed to the threat and use 
of the DSU and poorly equipped to employ the same machinery in their defence or 
offence” (Narlikar 2004;140) 
 
The same is argued regarding the possibilities to retaliation the DSB gives to 
parties that engage in a dispute settlement procedure and win. Countries are 
allowed to retaliation measures but regardless of this possibility African states are 
unlikely to impose effective sanctions towards developed countries as they are too 
small and too dependent on their larger trading partners (Narlikar 2004:140). 
Jackson refers to retaliation measures for LDCs’ as ”shooting itself in the foot”, 
because of the retaliations economic harm on the imposing country. By restricting 
access to their markets they harm the consumers and import dependent producer 
as these groups would face higher prices (Gross 2006:327; Jackson 2008:452). 
 The prevailing opinion before the cotton case tends to have been that the 
increased legalization would not benefit the African states if they were not 
actively taking part in the creating of the rules. This has not historically occurred, 
mainly as a consequence of lack of capacity and resources due to domestic 
institutional weakness (Fasan 2003:160, Makori 2005:221f). These disadvantaged 
would give developing countries limited possibilities to litigate in trade disputes 
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even though granted with a more effective system of rules and the theoretical 
possibility to enforce violations through DSB (Narlikar 2004:136).  
The fact that the C4 countries made use of the westernized legal system within 
the organization and used it against its creators may be seen as a proof for how the 
legalization levels the playing field. This is in line with what Abbot and Snidal 
points out as an important factor for developing states when benefitting from hard 
law. It creates justice regardless of who created the system and on whose 
traditions it is built. Since the US largely has been involved in the creating of the 
rule based system on which the DSB lies they are more eager to comply with its 
rulings (Heinisch 2006:253). Heinisch argues that regardless of the legal system 
the playing field will still not be levelled. This is because the power balance 
between weak and powerful states is still too uneven in global power politics in 
which the WTO is just a part as it is tied to a broader regime; global politics. 
However the fact that developing countries are increasingly filing challenges for 
adjudication shows that the legal system is legitimate. The dispute settlement 
process can therefore be seen as an effective vehicle for challenging the trade 
policies of more powerful industrialised states (Heinisch 2006:263).  
5.2 Unilateral, bilateral or multilateral  
Legalists argue that bilateral negotiations make small states hesitate challenging 
their larger trade partners on which their trade depends. However, precise legal 
rules and an enhanced dispute settlement system offer weaker states an increased 
control over unilateral action by powerful states such as the US (Jackson 
2008:439f, Fasan 2003:144-145). As argued by Abbott and Snidal hard law 
protects developing states from arbitrary actions associated with negotiations. 
Increased legalization could benefit developing states by reducing discrimination 
in international trade. This would increase developing countries access for their 
products on Western markets by legally restraining arbitrary use of power from 
developed countries (Fasan 2003:145, 150). The bargaining power between 
LDC:s and MDC:s in multilateral trade negotiations is economically as well as 
politically characterized by inequality  (ibid). This points towards an advantage 
for developing countries when administering hard law as it creates predictability 
and make LDC less vulnerable to arbitrary negotiations (Abbott & Snidal 
2000:427).  
Lee and Smith conclude that LDCs’ are often weak in the WTO negotiations 
because of their large economic dependence on the EU and US (Lee & Smith 
2008: 5). Whether this unbalanced power situation would be any different when 
leaning on a legalized system is disputed. In Gross’ article it is argued that 
regardless of the multilateral dispute settlement the developing states are still very 
dependent on bilateral agreements outside of the WTO. These bilateral 
agreements are largely seen as favours to the LDC’s. They make the LDC 
vulnerable and effectively prevent them to engage in a legal dispute against the 
“hand that feeds them” (Gross 2006:371). This is a sign that soft law is still ruling 
 16 
 
the overarching international relations between states and that the WTO disputes 
are not isolated to only the organization. Abbott and Snidal argue in the case of 
hard law that tying an agreement to a broader regime is an effective way to ensure 
compliance since the reputational costs for non-compliance would be enormous 
and spread through the entire regime (Abbott & Snidal 2000:427). This may be 
how LDC argue when contemplating to engage in legal disputes within the WTO; 
it would be too costly for them diplomatically as a reputation as uncooperative 
might affect their negotiations outside of the WTO. LDC’s are historically more 
in favour of bilateral dispute settlement, something that has also been suggested 
by Burkina Faso’s president Compaoré (WTO Trade Policy Review Burkina Faso 
2004; Fasan 2003:162f).  
Gross sees a danger that a further increased legalization will push states to 
engage in bilateral diplomatic negotiations instead of risk being involved in long 
and cost demanding legal disputes. This would again put LDC’s and Burkina Faso 
in the difficult position of being vulnerable and in the hands of larger trading 
partners and victims for arbitrary negotiations. The use of bilateralism is common 
in US negotiations with developing countries, perhaps as a deliberate attempt of 
the US to conquer and divide. By making agreements regarding agriculture as one 
topic this is easily achieved as many African states are net importer of food stuff 
and thus benefit from subsidised farming (Lee & Smith 2008). The US favouring 
of soft law unilateral negotiations is likely to be preferred as it means smaller 
sacrifices in regard of sovereignty (Abbott & Snidal 2000:435).   
5.3 Reputational cost creates compliance 
The legal dispute over the cotton subsidies brought severity to the matter and 
seems to be what may create actual compliance. The C4s threat to leave the 
negotiations in Cancún and later their decision to do so if no action on the cotton 
initiative was taken is understandable as they are losing large amounts of income 
on the present system (Anderson & Valenzuela 2007:1291). Regardless of these 
facts the US refused to negotiate further reduction of the challenged subsidies. 
When the Panel ruling was announced a few months later they did however agree 
to comply with the ruling (Gross 2006:383). The cost for non-compliance with 
hard law is significant both in regards to the reputational costs associated with 
breaking the law and economically when risking retaliation (Abbott & Snidal 
2000:431). As discussed above developing countries use of retaliation measures is 
rarely used. It is not a lack of power from the C4 states that is the main issue 
rather it is the WTO’s incapacity to force the Americans to comply with existing 
liberal trade rules and obligations (Lee & Smith 2008). Jackson argues that it is 
difficult getting compliance from the United States, because of the necessity to 
persuade Congress to act. Large actors in the WTO have decided in many 
instances to go ahead with whatever action they intended as the time horizon for 
compliance is not specified and they do not face an instant threat. Developed 
states unwillingness to comply even with legal rulings further puts an emphasis on 
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the importance of reputational costs to achieve results. As Christine M Makori 
argues the significance of the cotton case was implied by Brazil’s decision to take 
the US subsidies to the DSB (Makori 2005:207). Regardless of the outcome of the 
legal case its mere existence had a positive effect on the LDCs’ position as the 
issue was brought in to daylight and acknowledged in media. Gross claims that 
this attention would have been non-existing if the cotton issue had only been dealt 
with within the DSB and not at the same time been the topic for intense 
negotiations within the Doha round. Anderson and Valenzuela concludes that the 
cotton initiative created leverage in the DS267 (Anderson & Valenzuela 
2007:1281, 1291) Also in the attempt to attract the media’s attention a soft law 
approach seems to be more feasible. The fact that the general council was set to 
handle the matter brought on the attention of the civil society as the negotiations 
are a much more public matter than the legal rulings. The negotiation track 
brought on the interest from the general public and civil society (Gross 2006:381). 
 
“...the increased awareness created by the SIFC3, particularly at the WTO 
Ministerials which are magnets for world media attention, increased the pressure 
on the US to comply with the Panel rulings. Thus, cotton demonstrates how 
linkages and complementarities can be established between the two tracks along 
which the cotton issue has been pursued” (Gross 2006:381).  
 
Abbott and Snidal argue reputational costs are an important way to achieve 
compliance. Even in the context of the limited traditional WTO remedies, 
reputational costs are often an effective mechanism to encourage WTO-
compatible behaviour. Bad reputation is costly regardless if created when using 
hard law or soft law. It is more obvious when using hard law whether a ruling has 
been disregarded and not acted in compliance with. This compared to the more 
blurry agreements in less transparent soft law negotiations. Therefore reputational 
costs may be higher in a hard law system. Developed states who are brought to 
court more frequently by developing countries, may be encouraged to act in a 
more WTO-consistent manner (Hoekman & Mavroidis 2000:540 in Gross 2006; 
373). Increased presence by the LDC’s in the DSB is crucial to ensure the larger 
actors, in this case the US, to act in compliance with legal rulings against them. 
Reputational costs became large for the US regarding the cotton. The cotton 
case was largely made the civil societies and media’s favourite issue (Heinisch 
2006:264f). New York Times published a number of articles on the topic, the WB 
and IMF both published articles arguing for lowering of the subsidies. The human 
aspect and the impact the subsidies had on the West African population was 
highlighted by former UN secretary general, Kofi Annan and organizations like 
Oxfam. All these external players contributed to creating a very graphic picture of 
a David and Goliath situation (Heinisch 2006:264f). This media attention and the 
reputational costs for the US were created by the non-compliance with the ruling 
as well as their unwillingness to negotiate the Cotton Initiative. 
                                                
3 Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton e.g. the cotton initiative 
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5.4 Why did Burkina Faso prefer a soft law 
approach? 
Most scholars tend to consider the cotton initiative and the increased presence in 
the negotiations e.g. Compaoré’s presentation of the initiative in June 2003 the 
most important sign of increased influence. The cotton initiative rather than the 
DS267 is also considered the starting point for cotton as a topic of special focus 
by Lee and Smith. This even though they also acknowledge the fact that by the 
time of publishing their study in 2008 still no actual progress has been made 
neither regarding the legal case or any actual result of the cotton initiative. The 
promises made by the US were toothless since they mostly focused on lowering 
tariffs in to the US something that really has no real effect on the C4 as they do 
not export cotton to the US (Lee & Smith). This is a good example of the 
downsides of soft law. The negotiations managed to lead to agreements between 
the parties which shows soft laws advantages as it is more achievable and allows 
compromising and helps parties create mutually beneficial deals (Abbott & Snidal 
2000:435). However as argued by Lee and Smith this concurrence were toothless 
and without any real effect largely because of the non-existing costs for non-
compliance. Lack of success in the Doha Development negotiations also means 
lack of success for the cotton initiative. Abbott and Snidal’s theory that soft law is 
more achievable due to the possibility to meet in the middle in negotiations is not 
true in this case. This point is however supported by the agreements made in 
Cancún and Hong Kong in regards to the cotton initiative. It was fairly easy for 
the states to reach an agreement since the C4 was not threatening to support the 
initiative with legal measures. By negotiating that certain conditions had to be met 
for the agreed changes to be implemented there was a possibility that no change in 
the subsidy policies had to be made at all. To avoid legally binding agreements 
was crucial for the US as the political cost of giving up sovereignty in this case 
would have been too large. Sovereignty costs associated with hard law is larger 
for developed states (Abbott & Snidal 2000:447f). This is more true regarding the 
US than any other WTO member due to US domestic politics and the difficulties 
of gain support from Congress  (Jackson 2008:451). The US farm lobbying group 
is very strong. New farm bills with increased cotton subsidies has been approved 
and implemented over the years that the DS267 and the Cotton initiative has been 
on the agenda (Bhagwati 2004, Heinisch 2006, Lee & Smith 2008). To ignore the 
domestic pressure for cotton subsidies due to international law would most likely 
have been political suicide.   
 
 “The WTO is one of the most important institutions in global economic 
governance, because it is legally binding for states as well as for nonstate 
actors.” (Mori 2004:412).   
 
Jackson, who is an outspoken legalist, claims that an institutional structure 
must have an existing rule-system that the members are expected to comply with. 
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Like Abbott and Snidal he argues that it creates stability and predictability 
(Jackson 2008;438f). Lee and Smith suggest that any significant progress is often 
due to the judicial process rather than only negotiation (Lee & Smith 2008:6). 
They argue, as Abbott and Snidal mean often is the case with legalists, that 
“negotiations are conducted in the shadow of law” which indicate the view that 
soft law is the absence of hard law. Regardless of the many voices in favour of 
legal disputes Burkina Faso chose not to engage in the DS267 as a third party but 
was instead highly involved in the cotton initiative.  The initiative is also 
considered a more important turning point by The Re´seau des Organisations 
Paysannes et des Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, ROPPA, a labour 
organization for west African cotton farmers (Heinisch 2006:267). Burkina Faso 
and the C4 countries preferred to engage in the Cotton initiative rather than 
DS267 for various reasons. Within the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO 
a ruling may state that steps towards compliance are to be taken by the loosing 
part. These steps might also only be taken only towards the complainant 
regardless of the WTO principles of Most Favoured Nation, MFN4 (Gross 
2006:372f). This might leave countries that sign up as third parts to a dispute in a 
no better situation then before regardless of a victorious outcome (ibid). The 
differences in gains from DS267 compared to the possible gains for developing 
countries in regards to the cotton initiative are discussed by Kym Anderson and 
Ernesto Valenzuela in their article from 2007. The reforms suggested in the cotton 
initiative would benefit the C4s position to a lager extent than compliance with 
DS267 would. The difference is that compliance with the ruling would 
unilaterally force the US to change their support program to their farmers while 
the cotton initiative calls for cuts in subsidies from all parties. Economically the 
C4 would therefore be better off with an agreement on the cotton initiative 
(Anderson & Valenzuela 2007:1292). 
 
“Thus while the WTO dispute settlement case is potentially very helpful to non-US 
cotton producers, at best it is likely to generate barely half the benefits that could 
come from Doha cotton reform” (Anderson & Valenzuela 2007:1297). 
 
                                                
4 No WTO member country can discriminate between their trading partners. A favour towards one member state 
must be given equally towards all member states (WTO web pages on principles).  
 20 
 
6   Conclusion 
 
It is a fine line to walk when allowing an open approach to steer the emphasis of 
the analysis without letting the result be too dependent of the chosen material.  
Many scholars argue for a soft law approach or hard law approach due to different 
factors. As seen in the analysis, focus is put on topics that tie in well with the 
theory; for example the US unwillingness to debate the cotton initiative but, at 
least on paper, agreement to comply with the DS267. Other topics, like the impact 
by civil society do not find support in the theory of hard and soft law presented by 
Abbott and Snidal but still provides valuable standpoints in the importance of 
DS267 as well as the cotton initiative. 
The aim with this thesis was to answer the question; 
 
Has the use of the WTO legal system regarding the cotton case resulted in 
changed position for Burkina Faso within the WTO according to international 
scholars? 
 
My answer to the question will be yes, both due to topics supported by the 
theory and topics not addressed in the theory. In the analyzed material a 
consequent emphasis is put on the C4s’ raised voice when suggesting the cotton 
initiative. The political pressure the cotton initiative created as the C4 were 
represented by top level politicians in the negotiations is stressed as advantages 
for soft law. The soft law approach and the involvement of top level politicians 
managed to engage the civil society to a larger extent than the hard law approach. 
The involvement of civil society and the media attention that was created is at 
least briefly touched upon by every studied scholar. The much lower economical 
cost for the cotton initiative is also highlighted by numerous scholars. Most 
important tend to be the ability to reach agreements by applying soft law since 
compromising is an option. 
However feasible the cotton initiative proved to be to some extent, the C4s’ 
ability to achieve their goals through hard law is increasingly acknowledged by 
scholars. The increased cost for non-compliance and the developed states 
unwillingness to break the law is seen as a levelling of the playing field. The US 
showed willingness to act in compliance with the legal ruling but unwillingness to 
engage in negotiations regarding the cotton initiative unless on certain conditions. 
This creates an image were, if only a soft law approach is taken, Burkina Faso’s 
position in the WTO might change due to increased presence but no real influence 
would be reached as their presence is neglected by the developed countries. For 
actual influence to the C4 most scholars seems to consider an increased use of the 
DSB necessary as it ensures legitimacy to the world trade system. That a levelled 
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playing field is being created is also suggested by the emphasis many scholars put 
on the C4’s capacity to make use of the westernized legal system. Burkina Faso 
did not take part in the case but Benin and Chad’s’ participation equally affect 
Burkina Faso’s position within the organization as a consequence of the MFN 
principle. An important consequence for C4 due to the increased legalization is 
predictability. It is stressed that the arbitrary outcomes of negotiations are 
extremely costly for developing states as they to a large extend will have to accept 
whatever is offered to them. To have a legal ruling on their side is important 
leverage in any further dealing in regards to the cotton issue.  
Regardless of lack of actual compliance the studied articles show an increased 
positive attitude towards the legal approach from the year of 2003 to 2008. Also 
an increased amount of articles on the subject has been published especially after 
the Cancún conference in 2005 and the ruling against America the same year. This 
quantitative observation however indicates an increased interest in the C4 and 
their struggle against the US, the David and Goliath image, rather than saying 
anything about the consequences of the legalization. 
The US, the world’s most powerful state was legally challenged on equal 
terms by a part supported by C4 states. The fact that the case was initiated proves 
that large developed states no longer can consider WTO as an organization for 
their own convenience. The legal principles are to be followed by all member 
states. The price for non-compliance is so far mostly reputational but as certain 
developing states are increasingly important for the world trade it may soon be 
economically costly to be faced with countermeasures from these states. 
Regardless of the larger medial interest in the negotiations the DSB cases are 
more transparent and it becomes more obvious when a state is acting 
inconsistently with the rules thus the reputational cost also gets larger.  
These factors highlighted by various scholars, shows that the legal system in 
the WTO has resulted in a changed position for Burkina Faso in the organization. 
Regardless if the legal approach will be increasingly used by LDCs’, which is the 
prevalent opinion by studied scholars; it gives the opportunity to approach one 
issue in two different ways.  
6.1 Topics for further research  
The topic of increased legalization in the WTO is an interesting field to study as 
the organization has such an intricate legal system for an international 
organization. Compliance and implementation of the WTO rulings is a suggested 
topic for further research. The aim to implement within “a reasonable period of 
time” has led to slow progress not only in the US but in the EU and large 
developing states as well. The relationship between LDC’s and larger developing 
will prove interesting over the next years. Larger developing countries like India, 
China and Brazil provides there farmers with favourable deals on electricity and 
pesticides creating an unfair advantage. Increased cooperation between 
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developing states to increase influence might take place but it is possible that the 
competition between larger and smaller developing countries will enhance.  
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